

COUNTYWIDE JOURNAL ENTRY ASSURANCE ENGAGEMENT

Report No. AE-2025-01

JANUARY 28, 2025

Utah County Auditor Internal Audit Division
Internal Audit Manager: Calvin Bergmann, CIA, MPA
Senior Internal Auditor: Mont Wade, CIA

Utah County
HEART of UTAH

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AUDITOR'S LETTER

Office of the County Auditor

Internal Audit Division

January 28, 2025

Rodney Mann, Utah County Auditor
Utah County Auditor's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 3600
Provo, Utah 84606

Dear Mr. Mann:

The Internal Audit Division ("Division") performed an assurance engagement of Utah County Financial Information Systems ("COFIS") journal entries. During this limited review, we performed the following procedures:

1. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested a sample of COFIS General Ledger Module journal entries for valid and accurate documentation.
2. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested the population of COFIS General Ledger Module cancelled journal entries for a valid documented cancellation reason.
3. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested a sample of COFIS General Ledger Module DEPT security user journal entries for the ability of each user to finalize any journal entry.
4. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested a sample of COFIS General Ledger Module DOALL security user journal entries for the ability of each user to finalize their own created journal entry.
5. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested the population of COFIS General Ledger Module REVIEW security users for the ability of each user to create a journal entry.
6. For the period of January 1, 2024–September 30, 2024, tested the population of COFIS General Ledger Module AUDITOR security users for the ability of each user to create a journal entry.

7. During January 2025, tested Report No. AE-2024-6's Finding 7.1 Information Systems Department corrective action plan of:
    a. "We have removed DOALL access from the following employees: Ranjith Lakshman, Mike Johnson, Leena Kumar, and Brandon Davis. Mike Kniephof and Matt Bailey currently retain DOALL access to manage ongoing programming support duties."
    b. "To ensure the integrity of the COFIS General Ledger, we will implement controls to properly manage COFIS security access for users and will also look at how we can efficiently and effectively utilize Separation of Duties (SoD) to manage business and support functions."
8. During January 2025, within a COFIS software testing environment, viewed the Associate Director of Financial Services verify that:
    a. A user with DEPT security cannot finalize any journal entry.
    b. A user with DOALL security cannot finalize their own created journal entry.
    c. A user with REVIEW security cannot create a journal entry.
    d. A user with AUDITOR security cannot create a journal entry.
    e. A user who creates a journal entry, which is finalized by a separate user, cannot delete the finalized journal entry that they initially created.
    f. A journal entry that has been finalized cannot be cancelled (i.e., deleted) following a month-end close.
    g. A user cannot edit a finalized or deleted journal entry.
    h. A cancellation reason must be entered before a journal entry is cancelled.
    i. A duplicated journal entry created from a previously finalized journal entry does not include original finalized journal entry dates.
9. Tested that deleted journal entries (i.e., cancelled finalized journal entries) are saved in a log.

The Division documented one unaddressed previous engagement finding during the engagement. This finding's numbering is correlated with its original engagement report's procedure numbering. We provide a recommendation to correct this unaddressed previous engagement finding.

Note that our report, by nature, disproportionately focuses on weaknesses. This does not mean there were not strengths within the areas reviewed and other areas not reviewed. For example, we note that COFIS General Ledger DOALL security permissions were removed from several Information Systems Department employees.

The Division appreciates the courtesy and assistance extended to us by County personnel during the engagement process. We look forward to a continuing professional relationship.

Sincerely,

Utah County Internal Audit Division

CC: Danene Jackson, Associate Director of Financial Services, Utah County Auditor's Office
Jeremy Walker, Director of Financial Services, Utah County Auditor's Office
James Longhurst, Associate Director, Utah County Information Systems Department
Patrick Wawro, Director, Utah County Information Systems Department
Kim Jackson, Utah County Treasurer; Utah County Audit Committee Member
Amelia Powers Gardner, Commissioner, Utah County Board of Commissioners; Utah County Audit Committee Member

FINDING(S) & OTHER MATTER(S): CURRENT ENGAGEMENT

None noted.

FINDING(S) & OTHER MATTER(S): PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT(S)

Report No. AE-2024-6 Finding 7.1: Insufficient Accounting and Programming Separation of Duties

Information Systems Management Response

Recommendation	Agree/Disagree	Corrective Action Plan	Name and Title of Employee Responsible for Implementation	Target Date*
We recommend management remove DOALL security from being assigned to these six Information Systems Department employee COFIS usernames in the COFIS production environment.	Agree	We have removed DOALL access from the following employees: Ranjith Lakshman, Mike Johnson, Leena Kumar, and Brandon Davis. Mike Kniephof and Matt Bailey currently retain DOALL access to manage ongoing programming support duties. To ensure the integrity of the COFIS General Ledger, we will implement controls to properly manage COFIS security access for users and will also look at how we can efficiently and effectively utilize Separation of Duties (SoD) to manage business and support functions.	James Longhurst Associate Director – Information Systems	11/23/2024

*Entered in MM/DD/YYYY format. Generally, the date should be within 90 days (but no longer than 180 days) of report issuance. If the recommendation has already been implemented, enter the date it was implemented.

Current Engagement Condition

COFIS DOALL access has been removed from Ranjith Lakshman, Mike Johnson, Leena Kumar, and Brandon Davis and COFIS DOALL access has not been removed from Mike Kniephof and Matt Bailey. The following has not been completed: “To ensure the integrity of the COFIS General Ledger, we will implement controls to properly manage COFIS security access for users and will also look at how we can efficiently and effectively utilize Separation of Duties (SoD) to manage business and support functions.”

Recommendation

We recommend management completely implement Report No. AE-2024-6 Finding 7.1’s corrective action plan.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE(S)

Report No. AE-2024-6 Finding 7.1: Insufficient Accounting and Programming Separation of Duties

Information Systems Management Response

Recommendation	Agree/Disagree	Corrective Action Plan	Name and Title of Employee Responsible for Implementation	Target Date*
We recommend management completely implement Report No. AE-2024-6 Finding 7.1's corrective action plan.	Agree	**DOALL Access Reduction:** Removed DOALL Access for Ranjith Lakshman, Mike Johnson, Leena Kumar, and Brandon Davis. Mike Kniephof and Matt Bailey currently retain DOALL access to manage ongoing programming support duties. **Security Control Implementation:** For managing COFIS security access, we have triggers in place that log and alert us whenever changes are made to the general security table. **Separation of Duties Implementation:** When a user requests any form of access to the general ledger, we do not grant it directly. Instead, we instruct them to request access from Danene in the Auditor's Office, who evaluates and grants access as appropriate. **Detective Controls**: We will implement a detective control by assigning a member of the database team to regularly audit any production data changes made by an IS programmer to the COFIS database. A report of each audit with be filled out and signed by the member of the database team performing the audit. This control will help to ensure transparency, accountability, and the integrity of production data, helping to detect unauthorized or unintended modifications.	James Longhurst	2/14/2025

*Entered in MM/DD/YYYY format. Generally, the date should be within 90 days (but no longer than 180 days) of report issuance. If the recommendation has already been implemented, enter the date it was implemented.